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Abstract
 
Poor protection of private property has limited the access to bank loans by private
enterprises in developing and transition economies. Under those circumstances,
private entrepreneurs have resorted to various ways of enhancing the 
 
de facto
 
protection of private property. Using a dataset of 3,073 private enterprises in
China, this paper empirically investigates the impact of political participation and
philanthropic activities – informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of
private property – on the access to bank loans.
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1. Introduction
 
Academic research and policy experimentation over the past 25 years have led to
an increasing consensus on the importance of private sector development in develop-
ing countries (Perotti, 2004). Private entrepreneurs have played a central role in
the transition of formerly planned economies to market economies (McMillan and
Woodruff, 2002). Both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have
made their assistance to the developing and transitional economies conditional on
the privatization of the state sector.
Despite its importance, however, private sector development has been ham-
pered by limited access to external finance.
 
1
 
 In general, private firms first use
internal capital (such as retained profits) for development because this does not
involve the information asymmetry problem associated with external finance. But,
as internal capital is often limited, especially for entrepreneurial firms, external
finance provides a much-needed additional source of capital. More importantly,
external finance facilitates efficient allocation of capital (Levine, 1997).
 
2
 
 External
finance is crucial to the development of private firms that are short of internal
capital but have good investment prospects, and it also increases and illuminates
the opportunity cost of misallocation of capital for private firms that are rich in
internal capital but have poor investment prospects.
Access to bank loans by private enterprises in developing and transitional
economies has been plagued not just by the standard information asymmetry problem
but, more crucially, by the poor protection of private property. A common feature
of developing countries is the lack of formal protection of private property, which
could well be the reason for the underdevelopment of those countries.
 
3
 
 In the
transition economies, private sector development was not even permitted until
some 25 years ago, and legal protection of private property has yet to stand the test
of time. Private property, when poorly protected, is subject to expropriation by
various parties in the society, and access to bank loans by private enterprises is
adversely affected. Furthermore, private enterprises also face discrimination. This
is because in many developing and transition economies the public sector remains
dominant (Todaro and Smith, 2003). Mindful of its inefficiency vis-à-vis the private
sector, the public sector may lobby the government to enact discriminatory policies,
in lending for example, against the private enterprises (Johnson, McMillan and
Woodruff, 2002).
 
1
 
 In most developing and transition economies financial markets are rudimentary and external finance is
often restricted to bank loans.
 
2
 
 See Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002), and Cull and Xu (2005) for the importance of external finance
in transition economies.
 
3
 
 There is a large literature on the importance of property rights protection for economic growth (Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Svensson,
1998).
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A case in point is China. Before China initiated economic reform in 1978, its
economy was virtually all state owned. Unlike some formerly planned economies
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that had mass privatization of
state-owned enterprises, China has taken a gradual approach to reforming its
state-owned enterprises
 
4
 
 (Bai 
 
et al.
 
, 2000; Bai, Lu and Tao, 2006). By 2000, after 22
years of economic reform, China still had a sizeable public sector. Throughout
China’s reform process, there has been favouritism toward the state sector and
persistent ideological biases against the private sector. In fact, protection of private
property was not formally written into China’s constitution until March 2004. In
the absence of formal protection of private property, private entrepreneurs face
risks of expropriation as well as discrimination (see, for example, Bai 
 
et al.
 
, 2004;
Brandt and Li, 2003; Wei and Wang, 1997). Consequently, private enterprises have
had difficulty in accessing external finance. The percentage of loans made by
state-owned financial institutions to private enterprises was almost zero (0.09
percent) in 1990 and remained low (0.59 percent) in 2001 (China’s statistical
yearbook, various years). The percentage of loans made by all financial institu-
tions to private enterprises was not much better, moving from 0.23 percent in
1990 to 0.77 percent in 2001; this was because of the dominance of state-owned
financial institutions and the politicization of the non-state-owned financial
institutions.
What is interesting and puzzling is that, despite the poor formal protection of
private property, China’s private sector has grown spectacularly in the last 28
years; its share of industrial output leaping from almost zero in 1978 to 14.75
percent in 2003.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that China’s private entrepreneurs have found
various ways of enhancing the 
 
de facto
 
 protection of private property – what
McMillan and Woodruff (2002) called informal substitutes for the lack of market-
supporting institutions. In particular, private entrepreneurs with higher social status
seem to enjoy better protection of their private property, and private entrepreneurs
can improve their social status through political participation and philanthropic
activities. The focus of this paper is to investigate, using a dataset of 3,073 private
enterprises, how political participation and philanthropic activities, which enhance
the 
 
de facto
 
 protection of private properties, alleviate the access to bank loans.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our
dataset, and construct the variable to measure access to bank loans by private
enterprises. In Section 3, we develop the main hypothesis about how political par-
ticipation and philanthropic activities – informal substitutes for the lack of formal
protection of private property – may improve access to bank loans. The impacts of
 
4
 
 The number of state-owned enterprises declined from 1.547 million in 1992 to 1.17 million in 2002 at an
annual rate of 2.73 percent.
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formal protection of private property and the information asymmetry between
lenders and borrowers are controlled for. In Section 4, we present the main results
of the empirical analysis. Section 5 draws some conclusions.
 
2. Access to bank loans by China’s private enterprises
 
Our data come from a survey of private enterprises in China conducted in 2000
jointly by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China, the All China Industry and Commerce Federation and
the China Society of Private Economy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
The sampling method of the survey was multistage stratified random sampling,
with the aim of achieving a balanced representation across all regions and indus-
tries. First, the total number of private enterprises to be surveyed was decided.
Second, for each of the 31 regions in China, six cities/counties were selected; these
included the capital city, one district-level city, one county-level city, and three
counties. Third, the number of private enterprises to be surveyed in each region
was the product of the region’s number of private enterprises as a percentage of
the national total and the total number of private enterprises in the survey. The
same method was used to decide the number of sample firms in every city/county,
and economic sector. Finally, after the determination of the number of private
enterprises in every subsample, private enterprises were sampled randomly. The
survey covered 3,073 private enterprises (about 0.2 percent of the total private
enterprises in China at the end of 1999) with representation in all 31 regions
and all economic sectors (excluding the sector of government, parties and social
organizations).
The survey questions were answered by the owners of the private enterprises.
They covered personal information about the entrepreneurs and information about
the private enterprises. Of particular interest to this study is that private entre-
preneurs were asked to indicate the degree of difficulty in obtaining bank loans
(denoted by 
 
Difficulty in access to bank loan
 
) using a scale between 1 and 5, with 1
being the easiest access and 5 the most difficult. In total, 2,854 out of 3,073 entre-
preneurs answered this question, and the percentages of entrepreneurs choosing 1,
2, 3, 4 and 5 are 2.59, 12.02, 22.07, 32.13 and 31.19 percent, respectively. It is clear
that access to bank loans is difficult for most private enterprises in China. In what
follows, we shall use this assessment of difficulty (
 
Difficulty in access to bank loan
 
)
as the dependent variable in a regression analysis about the determinants of access
to bank loans.
 
5
 
5
 
 Beck 
 
et al.
 
 (2006) also use subjective evaluations on the degree of difficulty for the access to bank loans.
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3. Determinants for the access to bank loans
 
3.1 Political participation and philanthropic activities
 
Throughout the economic reform in the past 28 years, the Chinese government
has refrained from privatizing its inefficient state-owned enterprises on a massive
scale. One rationale for this gradual reform approach is that maintaining inefficient
state-owned enterprises is a second-best way of providing social stability, which is
beneficial to all firms operating in the national economy (Bai 
 
et al.
 
, 2000; Bai, Lu
and Tao, 2006). Along with the gradual reform approach, however, there has been
favouritism toward the state sector and persistent ideological biases against the
private sector. It was only in the 1988 amendment to the Constitution of the
People’s Republic of China (approved by the First Plenary of the Seventh People’s
Congress on 12 April 1988) that private sector development was permitted but
considered to be supplementary to the working of the socialist economy. The role
of the private sector was then elevated to being important to the socialist market
economy in the 1999 amendment to the Constitution (approved by the Second
Plenary of the Ninth People’s Congress on 15 March 1999). Finally, in the 2004
amendment to the Constitution (approved by the Second Plenary of the Tenth
People’s Congress on 14 March 2004), private sector development was encouraged,
and formal protection of private property was enacted.
Protection of private property depends on both good laws and strong enforce-
ment.
 
6
 
 In the case of China, although the constitutional amendment protecting
private property was enacted in 2004, its enforcement varies from province to
province (Cull and Xu, 2005). In the absence of formal protection of private pro-
perty, there should be risks of expropriation and discrimination, making it difficult
for private entrepreneurs to secure bank loans. Although the ultimate cause for the
difficulty in access to bank loans is the lack of formal protection of private property,
entrepreneurs can alleviate the problem by enhancing the 
 
de facto
 
 protection of
their property. As pointed out by McMillan and Woodruff (2002), in transition
economies, laws are often non-existent or not enforceable, and entrepreneurs
cannot rely on the legal system to secure protection of private properties. Instead,
they resort to informal substitutes for the missing market-supporting institutions.
Causal observations in China suggest that entrepreneurs with higher social
status enjoy better 
 
de facto
 
 protection of their private properties. Presumably, expro-
priation of and discrimination against private enterprises would cause much more
bad publicity and increase costs for the instigators in cases where the owners of the
private enterprises have higher social status. It is also possible that entrepreneurs
 
6
 
 La Porta 
 
et al.
 
 (1998) show that strong enforcement is not a substitute for poor laws on the books, while
Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) find the reverse is also true: good laws cannot substitute for weak
enforcement.
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with higher social status have more opportunities to interact with government
officials, directly and indirectly influencing the implementation of government
policies with respect to the protection of private property.
Private entrepreneurs can improve their social status through political partici-
pation and philanthropic activities. We first focus on the effect of private entre-
preneurs’ political participation on their access to bank loans.
 
7
 
 Here, political
participation includes membership of the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC), the
highest organ of state power in China, or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC), the advisory body to the Chinese People’s Congress and the
government. Two dummy variables are thus constructed based on entrepreneurs’
personal information. One is 
 
CPC member
 
, which takes the value of 1 if an
entrepreneur is a member of the People’s Congress and 0 otherwise, and the
other dummy variable is 
 
CPPCC member
 
, which takes the value of 1 if an entre-
preneur is a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and
0 otherwise. We also focus on the effect of private entrepreneurs’ philanthropic
activities, such as donating money to social welfare programmes, on their access to
bank loans. A variable, denoted by 
 
Donation
 
, is constructed, which is the logarithm
of the amount of donations the enterprise has made throughout its history.
Through political participation and philanthropic activities, an entrepreneur
increases his social status, and enjoys better 
 
de facto
 
 protection of his private
property, which in turn leads to easier access to bank loans. Thus, we have our
main hypothesis: 
 
Private enterprises whose owners have more political participation or
which conduct more philanthropic activities face less difficulty in getting access to bank
loans.
 
There is an emerging literature regarding the impact of political connections on
firm performance (Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2006; Fisman,
2001;  Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). A general finding of this
literature is that politically connected firms enjoy better yet undeserved treatments
from governments or financial institutions than those without political con-
nections. In the case of China, however, private enterprises are in general discrim-
inated against, and we expect that those private enterprises whose owners are
more politically active have better and more justifiable access to bank loans.
Regarding the impact of firms’ philanthropic activities on their access to bank
loans, the theoretical analysis of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) suggests possible back-
door deals between politicians and firms: firms donate money to projects favoured
by politicians in return for easy access to bank loans. Our hypothesis posits that
disadvantaged private entrepreneurs in China donate money to achieve higher
social status and secure better 
 
de facto
 
 protection of their private property, thereby
having better and more justifiable access to bank loans.
 
7
 
 Using Chinese data, Li 
 
et al.
 
 (2005) examine how entrepreneurs’ political participation may affect their
enterprises’ financial performance.
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3.2 Protection of private property
 
There is a large literature regarding the impact of property rights protection on
access to external finance (see, for example, Cull and Xu, 2005; Johnson, McMillan
and Woodruff, 2002; La Porta 
 
et al.
 
, 1998). Although the main hypothesis of this
study is about the impact of political participation and philanthropic activities on
access to bank loans, it is important to control for the effects of property rights
protection.
Private property, when poorly protected, is subject to expropriation by various
parties in the society and particularly by government officials (Bai 
 
et al.
 
, 2004). In
China, local government officials may impose informal levies on private enter-
prises to supplement their fiscal revenues, and may even extort bribes for personal
gains.
In general, when private enterprises face higher risks of expropriation, banks
are less willing to lend them money, thereby making their access to bank loans
more difficult (the supply-side effect).
 
8
 
 The demand-side story is more complicated.
On the one hand, private enterprises with higher risks of expropriation have less
incentive for investment and hence lower demand for bank loans. On the other
hand, as Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002), and Cull and Xu (2005) argue,
in the presence of expropriation risks, private enterprises prefer external finance to
internal finance for further development, although the incentive for further develop-
ment itself is weakened. Overall, the supply-side effect seems to be the dominant
effect for private enterprises in China,
 
9
 
 and we thus have the following control for
the empirical study: 
 
Control 1: It is more difficult for private enterprises to get bank loans
if they face greater risk of expropriation (for instance, they may have to pay higher informal
levies and/or face more serious corruption problems).
 
Two variables are constructed to capture the risks of expropriation faced by
private enterprises. The first one is a dummy variable, denoted by 
 
Informal levy
 
,
which takes a value of 1 if the answer to the survey question about whether a
private enterprise has paid any informal levies is ‘yes’ and 0 otherwise.
 
10
 
 The
second variable is also a dummy variable, denoted by 
 
Corruption
 
, which takes the
value of 1 if the answer to the survey question about whether it is necessary to
 
8
 
 Although most China’s banks are state-owned, they have undergone restructuring including the use of
incentive contracts for managers, and have become increasingly profit-oriented (Cull and Xu, 2003).
 
9
 
 The dependent variable for this study is a subjective score given by private entrepreneurs on the degree
of difficulty for the access to bank loans. It reflects the entrepreneurs’ ease of access to bank loans, condi-
tional on their demand for bank loans. In addition, our data enable us to further construct a sub-sample in
which only those firms who wish to borrow from banks are included, and our main results still hold in this
sub-sample. See Section 4 for details.
 
10
 
 Although both informal levies and donations are cash flows from enterprises without direct paybacks,
they are different in nature. In general, private enterprises involuntarily pay out informal levies, but are
voluntary in making donations.
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apply stricter anti-corruption policies than the existing ones is ‘yes’ and 0
otherwise.
In addition to the risks of expropriation when private property is not securely
protected, private enterprises may also encounter all kinds of discrimination as
compared with their state-owned counterparts. As argued by McMillan and Wood-
ruff (2002), an inefficient yet dominant state sector has both incentives and means
to lobby for discriminatory policies against the private sector. The scope of discrim-
ination can be very broad, covering almost all aspects of business operation, such
as restrictions on market entry and exit, limited access to infrastructure services
and lack of detailed information on government policies. Thus we have the follow-
ing control for the empirical study: 
 
Control 2: It is more difficult for private enterprises
to get bank loans if they encounter more or severer discriminatory restrictions in business
operations.
 
An index (denoted by 
 
Discrimination
 
) is constructed to reflect the risk of
discrimination faced by private enterprises. The survey had 13 questions regarding
whether private enterprises are treated similarly to their state-owned or foreign-
invested counterparts in various aspects of business operation. One of the ques-
tions is about external borrowing, and it is excluded from our construction of the
index because the degree of difficulty in access to bank loan is the dependent
variable in our study. There are three possible answers to each question: ‘the same’,
‘basically the same’ and ‘differently’. Generally, when a private enterprise is said
to be treated differently from state-owned or foreign-invested enterprises, it means
being treated unfairly or discriminated against. The answer to each of the remaining
12 questions is then given a value of 1 if it is ‘differently’ and 0 otherwise.
 
11
 
 The
index for the risk of discrimination is the sum of the values corresponding to the
12 survey questions.
We control for the risks of expropriation (Control 1) and discrimination (Con-
trol 2) because protection of private properties is an important determinant of the
access to bank loans. Given that banks in China are mostly state-owned, however,
one may argue that ease of access to bank loans, degree of discrimination, and risk
of expropriation are various measures of the government’s altitude toward the
private sector. When the government is positive toward the private sector, then
there is less discrimination, lower risk of expropriation and easier access to bank
loans. Thus, in order to focus on the impacts of political participation and philan-
thropic activities, we will also carry out regressions without Control 1 or 2.
 
11
 
 In the survey, questions about discrimination were asked and answered using both state-owned and
foreign-invested enterprises as references. Thus, two indices could be constructed. However, the correlation
between these two indices is 0.72, which shows that private enterprises in China are discriminated against
as compared with both state-owned and foreign-invested enterprises. In our analysis, for any particular
aspect of business operation, a private enterprise is said to be discriminated against if the entrepreneur of
this enterprise replied affirmatively to the survey question with regard to either state-owned or foreign-
invested enterprises.
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3.3 Information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers
 
It is well known that access to bank loans is complicated by the problem of infor-
mation asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. The information asymmetry
problem, which is generic to financial markets in both developed and developing
countries, is especially severe for private enterprises in China. It was only 25 years
ago that China’s private sector started to emerge with newly established and
privatized state-owned enterprises. Thus, most of China’s private enterprises are
smaller and younger than their state-owned counterparts and are at higher risk in
the eyes of lenders. In addition, with weak protection of private property, private
enterprises in China tend to disguise their actual performance, making it difficult
for lenders to screen loan applications (Cai, Liu and Xiao, 2004). Thus, it is desir-
able to control for the information asymmetry problem in our analysis on the
access to bank loans.
Three methods have been identified for solving the information asymmetry
problem. The first method is that of appraisal by means of an objective evaluation by
experts. One of the most commonly used appraisal schemes in the financial markets
is the rating of firms by independent credit rating agencies. If the rating is objective
then it should help firms to get access to bank loans. There could be some self-
selection bias, however, because only those private enterprises that have a chance of
getting bank loans may choose to have independent credit rating. To control for the
self-selection bias, we can focus on a subsample consisting only of private enter-
prises with credit ratings, and examine whether the level of rating has any effect on
the access to bank loans. To summarize: 
 
Control 3 (appraisal): (i) Access to bank loans
is easier for private enterprises that are rated by independent credit rating agencies.
(ii) Among private enterprises that are rated by independent credit rating agencies, those
with higher credit ratings are expected to have easier access to bank loans
 
.
Two independent variables are thus constructed. The first variable is a dummy
variable (denoted by 
 
Independent credit rating
 
) regarding whether the enterprise has
independent credit rating, and it takes the value of 1 if the answer is ‘yes’ and
0 otherwise. The second variable, denoted by 
 
High on credit rating
 
, is a dummy
variable, restricted only to those firms that have independent credit rating, and it
takes the value of 1 if the credit rating is ‘A’ and 0 otherwise.
The second method for dealing with information asymmetry is signalling,
meaning those actions taken by more informed parties to credibly demonstrate the
superior information they possess. In the case of securing bank loans, a private
enterprise can signal its capability of carrying out projects successfully and its
willingness to repay loans by adopting a better financial and management control
system. Other characteristics of the enterprise also contain useful signals about the
enterprise’s ability and willingness to repay loans: for example, the size of its
operation, the years of managerial experience of its owner, the capital–labour ratio
(a proxy for collateral), and the return on assets. Although these characteristics are
not necessarily chosen by the enterprise for the purpose of sending signals about
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its private information, we still classify them as signals to facilitate our exposition.
To summarize, we have: 
 
Control 4 (signalling): (i) Access to bank loans is easier for
private enterprises that adopt higher-quality financial and management control systems.
(ii) Access to bank loans is easier for private enterprises that have a larger scale of opera-
tion, or are managed by entrepreneurs with longer managerial experience, or have higher
capital–labour ratios, or enjoy higher return on assets.
 
Five independent variables are constructed accordingly. The first variable
relates to the enterprise’s financial and management control system. The survey
asked whether the enterprise has a formal financial control system or a corporate
charter. Because answers to these two questions are highly correlated, we combine
them into one dummy variable (
 
Internal control
 
), which takes the value of 1 if
the answer to either question is ‘yes’ and 0 otherwise. Second, the logarithm of
employment of a private enterprise, denoted by 
 
Size of establishment
 
, is constructed
as a proxy for the scale of operation. The third variable, defined as the logarithm
of entrepreneur’s management experience in years and denoted by 
 
Managerial
Experience
 
, indicates the quality of management. The fourth variable is the enter-
prise’s capital–labour ratio (
 
Capital–labour ratio
 
), which indicates the amount of
physical investment the firm has made and indirectly reflects the amount of collat-
eral it can pledge. The last variable is the return on assets, defined as the net profit
to total assets ratio and denoted by 
 
ROA
 
.
It should be pointed out that the main hypothesis may have some endogeneity
problems. For example, successful business operation in the past can create the
opportunity of political participation by private entrepreneurs and increase the
capacity for philanthropic activities of private enterprises. At the same time,
successful business operation in the past could also make it easy for private enter-
prises to convince bankers and secure bank loans. Control 4 (ii) concerns the past
performance of private enterprises (such as the size of operation, years of managerial
experience, and return on assets), and to some extent it mitigates the endogeneity
problem in the main hypothesis.
The third method of resolving information asymmetry is screening, meaning
those actions taken by the less informed parties to infer what information is held
by the more informed parties. Many screening devices have been developed and
adopted by financial institutions around the world. However, in the case of China,
the issue lies not in the availability of screening devices but in the incentives for
banks to use available screening devices. Compared with dominant state-owned
banks, non-state-owned financial institutions, which have emerged since the
economic reform in 1978, are more profit-oriented and therefore have a stronger
incentive to screen private enterprises regarding their financing needs. The pres-
ence of non-state-owned financial institutions varies from region to region; and
within each region, they are mostly located in small cities and counties. Therefore,
we have: 
 
Control 5 (screening): Access to bank loans is easier for private enterprises that
are located in smaller cities or counties and for those located in regions with higher
percentages of non-state-owned financial institutions.
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Two independent variables are constructed accordingly. The first one is the
percentage of loans issued by non-state-owned banks in a region in 1999 (
 
Percent-
age of loans by non-state banks
 
).
 
12
 
 The second variable, denoted by 
 
Located in small
city
 
, is a dummy variable regarding whether a private enterprise is located in a
small city or county as opposed to a large or medium city. It takes the value of 1
if the answer is affirmative, and 0 otherwise.
Banks in smaller cities/counties or regions with higher percentages of non-state-
owned financial institutions may discriminate less against private enterprises,
which makes access to bank loans easier for those private enterprises. However,
because we control for policy discrimination faced by private enterprises (Control
2), the endogeneity problem in Control 5 can be mitigated to some extent.
Summary statistics of the dependent variable and the independent variables
used in this study are listed in Table 1. Table 2 shows the correlation between these
variables.
 
12
 
 State-owned banks include People’s Bank of China, State Development Bank of China, Agricultural Develop-
ment Bank of China, Export-Import Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of
China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of Communications, CITIC Industrial
Bank, and Post Savings of China. All others are non-state-owned banks. 
 
Source
 
:
 
 
 
China Finance Statistics
 
,
1997–99.
Table 1. Summary statistics
Variables N Min Max Mean SD
Difficulty in access to bank loan 2,854 1  5 3.77 1.09
CPC member 3,070 0  1 0.16 0.37
CPPCC member 3,070 0  1 0.40 0.49
Donation 2,813 0  16.12 9.48 3.45
Informal levy 3,070 0  1 0.39 0.49
Corruption 3,063 0  1 0.56 0.49
Discrimination 1,483 0  12 5.07 3.94
Independent credit rating 2,647 0  1 0.24 0.43
High on credit rating  635 0  1 0.95 0.20
Internal control 3,070 0  1 0.85 0.35
Size of establishment 2,857 0  9.90 4.07 1.34
Managerial experience 3,030 0  3.82 2.25 0.69
Capital–labour ratio 2,896 0.77 1,290.32 8.14 32.80
ROA 1,950 0.00065  0.84 0.21 0.22
Percentage of loans by non-state banks 3,070 0.046  0.32 0.21 0.06
Located in small city 3,070 0  1 0.58 0.49
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Table 2. Correlation between variables
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
 
Difficulty in access 
to bank loan
 
1
 
1
Informal levy
 
2
 
0.081 1
 
0.000
Corruption 3 0.063 0.164 1
0.001 0.000
Discrimination 4 0.114 0.258 0.041 1
0.000 0.000 0.114
CPC member 5 −0.099 0.068 0.063 0.017 1
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.500
CPPCC 
member
6 −0.052 0.049 0.073 −0.008 0.016 1
0.005 0.005 0.000 0.749 0.367
Donation 7 −0.135 0.055 0.108 −0.023 0.168 0.272 1
0.000 0.003 0.000 0.383 0.000 0.000
Independent 
credit rating
8 −0.205 0.001 −0.006 −0.063 0.161 0.113 0.168 1
0.000 0.979 0.733 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000
High on credit
rating
9 −0.105 −0.006 0.002 −0.022 0.069 0.085 0.088 – 1
0.000 0.882 0.968 0.674 0.079 0.000 0.032 –
ROA 10 0.005 −0.015 −0.046 −0.051 −0.001 0.008 0.023 0.027 0.008 1
0.800 0.502 0.042 0.085 0.938 0.713 0.313 0.250 0.847
Size of 
establishment
11 −0.185 0.096 0.039 −0.003 0.264 0.242 0.405 0.355 0.126 0.050 1
0.000 0.000 0.034 0.900 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006
Managerial 
experience
12 −0.077 0.009 0.087 −0.005 0.108 0.194 0.229 0.112 0.078 −0.015 0.149 1
0.000 0.624 0.000 0.837 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.494 0.000
Capital labour 
ratio
13 −0.019 0.008 0.003 −0.031 0.019 0.052 0.079 0.044 0.039 −0.023 −0.017 0.017 1
0.291 0.677 0.060 0.007 0.271 0.003 0.000 0.022 0.326 0.307 0.363 0.350
Internal control 14 −0.068 0.066 0.036 −0.011 0.070 0.122 0.142 0.146 −0.048 0.029 0.272 0.011 0.048 1
0.000 0.000 0.044 0.652 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.221 0.102 0.000 0.547 0.007
Percentage of
loans by non-
state banks
15 −0.072 −0.052 −0.080 −0.138 −0.028 −0.073 −0.003 −0.001 −0.020 −0.050 0.051 0.019 −0.011 0.029 1
0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.894 0.997 0.607 0.024 0.006 0.281 0.560 0.102
Located in 
small city
16 −0.076 0.013 0.002 −0.021 0.062 −0.042 −0.073 0.039 −0.025 −0.016 −0.036 0.068 −0.099 −0.088 0.013 1
0.000 0.462 0.917 0.415 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.040 0.523 0.470 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.454
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4. The main results
Because the dependent variable for the access to bank loans takes the values 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5, the ordered logistic regression method is used in the main regression
analysis (Greene, 2003). The ordinary least square method is also used, mainly for
showing the relative quantitative importance of the various determinants of the
access to bank loans.
We first focus on the main hypothesis regarding the impacts of political partic-
ipation and philanthropic activities on the access to bank loans. As shown in column
1 of Table 3, the coefficient of CPC member is negative and statistically significant
at the 1 percent level, while that for CPPCC member is negative as predicted, but is
statistically insignificant. The results show that access to bank loans is significantly
easier for entrepreneurs who are members of the Chinese People’s Congress, but
membership of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference has a limited
Table 3. Regressions about difficulty in access to bank loans (ordered logistic regression)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
CPC member −0.39*** (0.10) −0.441*** (0.14) −0.13** (0.07) −0.222* (0.13)
CPPCC member −0.05 (0.07) 0.044 (0.11) 0.02 (0.10) 0.165 (0.13)
Donation −0.06*** (0.01) −0.053*** (0.02) −0.028* (0.016) −0.025 (0.02)
Informal levy 0.415*** (0.11) 0.444*** (0.13)
Corruption 0.353*** (0.11) 0.265** (0.13)
Discrimination 0.031** (0.01) 0.035** (0.02)
Independent credit rating −0.579*** (0.09) −0.639*** (0.14)
Internal control −0.07 (0.16) −0.102 (0.20)
Size of establishment −0.16*** (0.05) −0.144** (0.06)
Managerial experience 0.03 (0.07) 0.014 (0.09)
Capital–labour ratio −0.008*** (0.002) −0.021*** (0.01)
ROA −0.006 (0.02) −0.265 (0.26)
Percentage of loans by
non-state banks
−0.023*** (0.01) −0.039*** (0.01)
Located in small city −0.43*** (0.10) −0.345** (0.14)
Industry and region 
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,413 1,296 1,473 914
χ2 197.32 63.78 121.1 118.46
Probability <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Note: ***, **, *, + indicate significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent and 15 percent levels, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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effect. The difference between the explanatory power of CPC member and that of
CPPCC member can be understood in light of the political structure in China. The
People’s Congress is the highest lawmaking body in China. During the reform era,
its authority has been restored, and hence its superior importance. The CPPCC in
China is a collection of experts in support of the policies of the Chinese People’s
Congress and the Government. Thus, the CPPCC does not have as much political
power as the CPC. The coefficient of Donation is negative and statistically significant
at the 1 percent level, suggesting that by conducting more philanthropic activities
private entrepreneurs can have easier access to bank loans. Overall, the econometric
analysis as summarized in column 1 of Table 3 lends strong support to the main
hypothesis regarding the informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of
private property.
Next we control for the formal protection of private property (that is, controls
1 and 2). As shown in column 2 of Table 3, our main results on political participation
and philanthropic activities remain intact, while the coefficients of the variables
controlling for the formal protection of private property are as predicted. The coef-
ficients for both Informal levy and Corruption are positive and statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. They imply that private enterprises paying higher informal
levies face more difficulty in getting bank loans, and so do those facing more
serious corruption. These results support Control 1. The coefficient of Discrimination
is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, which means private enterprises
encountering more severe policy discrimination also have more difficulty in access-
ing bank loans, supporting Control 2.
Third, we control for the information asymmetry problem (Controls 3–5) and
test the robustness of the impacts of political participation and philanthropic
activities on the access to bank loans. As shown in column 3 of Table 3, our main
hypothesis remains strongly supported, and the coefficients of those variables con-
trolling for the information asymmetry problem are as predicted. Independent credit
rating has a negative coefficient with a 1 percent statistical significance, suggesting
that independent credit rating helps private enterprises obtain bank loans and
lending support to Control 3(i). Size of establishment and Capital–labour ratio both
have negative coefficients with a 1 percent statistical significance. These results
suggest that access to bank loans is easier for those private enterprises with a larger
scale of operation or with more physical assets that can serve as collateral for bank
loans, supporting part of Control 4. Both Internal control and ROA have the
predicted negative coefficients although they are statistically insignificant, which
suggests that both better internal control and higher return on assets have limited
effects on the access to bank loans.13 Managerial experience has a positive yet
13 Return on assets is an informative variable in a well-developed market. However, in the case of China,
where protection of private property was not even written into the constitution until March 2004, private
entrepreneurs were reluctant to reveal their rates of returns to the survey teams. Thus, this variable is not
expected to have significant explanatory power.
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statistically insignificant coefficient, possibly because experience prior to the
economic reform may not be meaningful and, furthermore, the managerial labour
market has yet to be developed. Percentage of loans by non-state banks and Located in
small city both have negative coefficients with a 1 percent statistical significance.
That is, access to a bank loan is easier for private enterprises that are located in
regions with higher percentages of non-state-owned-banks and for those that are
located in small cities or counties. These results lend strong support to Control 5.
When both formal protection of private properties (Controls 1 and 2) and the
information asymmetry problem (Controls 3–5) are controlled for, our main results
still hold as shown in column 4 of Table 3 though the statistical significance
decreases for some of the variables. To clarify the relative quantitative importance
of the various determinants of access to bank loans, the ordinary least square
method is used to repeat the analysis of Table 3 and the results are summarized in
Table 4.
Table 4. Regressions about difficulty in access to bank loans (ordinary least square)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
CPC member −0.20*** (0.05) −0.2185*** (0.08) −0.077* (0.044) −0.1283** (0.05)
CPPCC member −0.054 (0.044) 0.0144 (0.06) −0.023 (0.058) 0.0709 (0.07)
Donation −0.031*** (0.006) −0.0291*** (0.01) −0.013+ (0.009) −0.0088 (0.01)
Informal levy 0.2303*** (0.06) 0.2952*** (0.07)
Corruption 0.1536** (0.06) 0.0897** (0.04)
Discrimination 0.0100** (0.004) 0.0115** (0.005)
Independent credit rating −0.24*** (0.066) −0.2170*** (0.08)
Internal control −0.095 (0.086) −0.0732 (0.11)
Size of establishment −0.082*** (0.026) −0.0997*** (0.04)
Managerial experience −0.009 (0.042) −0.0262 (0.05)
Capital–labour ratio −0.004*** (0.001) −0.0084** (0.00)
ROA −0.003 (0.012) −0.2350 (0.18)
Percentage of loans by
non-state banks
−0.004 (0.002) 0.0081 (0.02)
Located in small city −0.24*** (0.06) −0.2055** (0.08)
Industry and region
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,621 1,346 1,540 936
Adjusted R2 0.1013 0.1304 0.1499 0.1888
Note: ***, **, *, + indicate significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent and 15 percent levels, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Before concluding our analysis, we carry out three more sets of regressions,
mainly in order to check the robustness of our main results. First, to control for the
possible self-selection bias as a result of better-performing firms choosing to have
an independent credit rating, we focus on the rating results as a more refined
variable of appraisal. As shown in column 1 of Table 5, our main results on
political participation and philanthropic activities still hold. Second, given that
poor protection of private property may affect both the demand for and the supply
of bank lending, we consider a subsample comprising only firms that wish to
borrow money to focus on the supply side. As shown in column 2 of Table 5, our
main results on both political participation and philanthropic activities still hold.
Finally, to control better for the effect of information asymmetry on the access to
bank loans, we focus on those private enterprises that had borrowed from the
banks. Generally speaking, a successful borrowing history helps resolve informa-
tion asymmetry in bank lending. Again, as shown in column 3 of Table 5, the main
results on political participation remain valid, while some of the variables related
to information asymmetry become less significant as expected.
Table 5. Robustness checks (ordered logistic regression)
Independent variables All hypotheses
with firms that
have credit rating
All hypotheses
with firms that
wish to borrow
All hypotheses
with firms that
had borrowed
CPC member −0.48** (0.22) −0.21** (0.10) −0.10** (0.04)
CPPCC member −0.35* (0.20) −0.058 (0.12) 0.026 (0.12)
Donation −0.053+ (0.034) −0.029+ (0.019) −0.027 (0.021)
Independent credit rating −0.51*** (0.13) −0.28*** (0.13)
High on credit rating −0.037 (0.56)
Internal control −0.15** (0.53) −0.41** (0.20) −0.16 (0.20)
Size of establishment −0.11 (0.089) −0.14** (0.06) −0.075 (0.058)
Managerial experience −0.024 (0.15) 0.11 (0.09) −0.031 (0.096)
Capital–labour ratio −0.012 (0.005) −0.008*** (0.003) −0.0062** (0.0030)
ROA −0.179*** (0.068) −0.004 (0.022) 0.0017 (0.022)
Percentage of loans by non-state banks −0.005 (0.08) 0.009 (0.039) 0.010 (0.049)
Located in small city −0.48*** (0.23) −0.33** (0.13) −0.29 (0.13)
Industry and region dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 403 1,094 1,008
χ2 269.4 1,126.6 865.6
Probability 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Note: ***, **, *, + indicate significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent and 15 percent levels, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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5. Conclusion
Private sector development has been identified as a driving force in the growth of
the developing and transition economies. Despite its importance, however, private
sector development has been hampered by the lack of external finance – limited
access to bank loans in particular – in those economies. Part of the problem arises
from the severe information asymmetry between banks and private enterprises.
But the key reason lies in the lack of formal protection of private property. Causal
observations reveal that, under those circumstances, entrepreneurs have resorted
to various ways of enhancing the de facto protection of their private property. One
way of doing this is to improve social status, possibly through political participa-
tion and philanthropic activities. Presumably, expropriation of and discrimination
against private enterprises would cause much more bad publicity, thereby increasing
the costs for the instigators, if the owners of the enterprises have higher social
status. It is also possible that entrepreneurs with higher social status have more
opportunities to interact with government officials, directly and indirectly influencing
the implementation of government policies with respect to the protection of
private property. Using a dataset of 3,073 private enterprises in China, this paper
empirically investigates the effects of formal and de facto property rights pro-
tection on the access to bank loans by private enterprises. We find that access to
bank loans by private enterprises is reduced by poorer formal protection of private
property (which raises the risks of expropriation and discrimination) but it is
enhanced by better de facto protection of private property achieved through politi-
cal participation and philanthropic activities. Those results are robust to various
controls for the information asymmetry between banks and private enterprises.
They have important policy implications for private sector development in the
developing and transition economies.
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